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he regards as a purely rational foundation, and to the clearing away of all rubbish he has devoted his life.

CARVETH READ.

LONDON.

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE. By E. Barker. London: Methuen & Co., 1906. Pp. xxii, 559.

Mr. Barker's book is not only a particularly competent, but in every respect a masterly presentation of its subject. The student could not well desire a more comprehensive or a more penetrating review of Greek political thought. Mr. Barker would not himself lay claim to any particular novelty or distinction of view; on the other hand his treatise may be regarded as a systematization (though it is much more) of the best results reached by modern thought and scholarship. Mr. Barker is, indeed, singularly equipped for such an undertaking. He is equally competent and instructed on the philosophical as on the historical side of his subject. The result is that he has given us a work which is not only eminently solid and thorough, but admirable alike in substance and in perspective. He has, in fact, succeeded to quite an unusual degree in carrying out the somewhat full program he sets before himself. "While attempting to refer Aristotelian conceptions to their sources in past speculation, and to their basis in contemporary Greek politics, I have also attempted to discuss the value of these conceptions to-day, and the extent to which they can be applied to modern politics."

The only general criticism of the book as a whole which I feel disposed to offer is that it tends to be voluminous both in form and in matter—resulting in an undue amount of iteration, and also in a certain amount of uncertainty, or at any rate oscillation of view. Mr. Barker, indeed, seems to show a laudable anxiety to preserve a balanced judgment rather than to fix impressions; but it is a method which has the defect of its quality. The average student (for whom Mr. Barker is presumably writing) may fail at times to see the wood for the trees. The argument is not only of the nature of a see-saw, but is apt at times to remain there. Mr. Barker's method, in fact, seems to more than reproduce the fluidity and indeterminateness of the subject-matter itself. It is only right to add that this excess or redundancy of statement applies mainly to minor and incidental discussions;

but it is apt to blunt the edge of the larger and more central conceptions which are generally stated with admirable clearness and force. An occasional summary might perhaps have helped Mr. Barker to leave a more clearly cut impression. There are certain things that might have been said once for all; there are too many views left for the reader to put together—too many for him to correct and to modify. As a matter of fact, Mr. Barker is at his best when he is generalizing. Nothing, for instance, could be better for its purpose than the introduction; and it would be easy to cite equally fine specimens of the best kind of generalization. Nothing again could be better than the firmness and precision with which Mr. Barker handles philosophical conceptions. The student who desires not only an *apparatus criticus* but directions toward a constructive theory of "politics," will find a great quantity as well as a fine quality of material in Mr. Barker's book for his purpose. It is, as suggested, somewhat of the nature of a quarry, which the student will have to work for himself; but it is perhaps after all none the worse for that.

In a book which covers so much ground it is a little difficult to select points for criticism or comment. Mr. Barker "begins from the beginning," making the best use he can of the somewhat scanty and uncertain material at his disposal. He is inclined throughout to lay some stress on the influence of anthropology upon political thought in Greece, and on the extent to which previous opinion had furnished a "prelude and preparation" for some of the distinctive features of the "Republic." The treatment of the Sophists is perhaps more ambitious than precise. Like Plato himself, Mr. Barker is tempted to elevate what may well have been only an *obiter dictum* of Protagoras to the dignity of a philosophical tenet. But, according to Mr. Barker, "'Man is the measure of all things' was not meant to deny the possibility of knowledge, or to make it the play of man's subjectivity; it was intended, on the contrary, to widen the province of knowledge, and to show that it was not dry bones, but full of human life, and instinct with human reason." And again, as applied to the State—"‘measured’ by man, it is found wanting. It does not satisfy his instinct for free expression and fulfilment. . . . The moral content of tradition and custom and institutions was opposed to the ideal code of morality suggested by the fundamental principle of human life."

Surely this is rather a modern development of what was after

all the main position of the Sophists for the purposes of Mr. Barker's history—to correct no doubt the one-sidedness of the view which took the State and its laws on trust; but to correct it by a general tendency to make the individual his own standard, and to refer all authority to convention. The Sophists doubtless fostered the spirit of self-assertion; but they were for the most part too conventional to raise it into a principle. In his account of Socrates, Mr. Barker perhaps fails to show that his "utilitarianism" was really another side of his "intellectualism," that is, of his tendency to make a rational purpose the criterion of good and evil; and has rather missed the significance of what is not very aptly described as "the whispers of a still, small voice ($\tauὸ δαυμόνιον$) to inspire his work." Does it not rather point to a hiatus in the Socratic theory of action? Socrates found himself taking, or rather refraining from, action when he could give no reason for so doing; and upon his view of action this phenomenon presented itself as something mysterious.

Mr. Barker's treatment of Plato is particularly careful and discerning. "Aristotle wrote the 'Politics,' but Plato is the great political thinker of Greece;" a hard saying, perhaps, in view of Mr. Barker's criticism of the "Republic," but it is one, nevertheless, which he succeeds in making good. But does not Mr. Barker lay more stress on the letter than on the spirit when he emphasizes the "separatism" in Plato's conception of the soul, and (by consequence) of the State? Plato specially guards himself against his "trichotomy" of the soul being taken for the whole truth. Regarded absolutely, the three "powers" of the soul have their specific functions, which cannot be confounded, but they can and do coöperate to form a unity—a unity which may be described as a certain rightness of relations; a unity, therefore, not of subjugation but of reconciliation. The suggestion that a "rigid separation" combined with a "rigid unification" is (or tends to be) the Platonic conception of ethics is one against which Plato himself may be cited as a witness in chief.

Mr. Barker's treatment of Plato's communism in general is just and pertinent. But is it not rather less than a half truth to suggest that modern socialism "demands an equal division of material goods for the sake of an equal division of material happiness?" Great as is the difference between the Platonic communism and modern socialism, the elements of affinity are at

least equally significant and instructive. Mr. Barker's attempt to trace savage and "barbarian" elements in the "Republic" is interesting, but the argument seems to be pushed to a point at which it becomes more fanciful than real. On the other hand, the discussions on Plato's conception of personality and on the nature and value of the Republic as an ideal are quite admirable. The remarks on the theory of punishment, however, seem hardly adequate either in themselves or in their relation to Plato; and more consideration might well have been given to Plato's conception of the bearing of an education in exact science on conduct and statesmanship. Taken as a whole, Mr. Barker's estimate of the value and of the limitation of Plato's political thought leaves little to be desired. The "staple of criticism," however, is not simply or solely that Plato was "too generously eager for the reign of pure truth and the realization of pure principle," but that he was too much oppressed with a sense of the evils about him; and perhaps more allowance might have been made in the case of Plato, as of Carlyle (with whom Mr. Barker likes to compare him), for the difficulty of reading humor, sarcasm and poetry for prose.

The account of Aristotle is very thorough and comprehensive, though in some respects less interesting and unfamiliar. A good deal of attention and criticism is directed to Aristotle's teleological method, and to very good purpose. It is, however, somewhat surprising that Mr. Barker should assert that "Aristotle differs from Plato in not believing in a single end, an idea of the good," more especially as he acknowledges that "the idea of God as the final cause, if pushed to its consequences, would involve the Platonic conception." The point of Aristotle's criticism of "the Idea of the Good" is not that such a conception is logically untenable—on the contrary, he is at some pains in the "Metaphysics" to establish such a conception himself—but that it must not be used in a way which would whittle away all differences; nor would Aristotle have regarded the Idea of the Good as used by Plato himself in the "Republic" as a "mere abstraction." It is, again, misleading to say that the conception of the unity of virtue is "attacked" by Aristotle in the "Ethics."

The treatment of the legal and economic ideas in Aristotle does not seem quite satisfactory. It is hardly sufficient to say that in Aristotle's theory, "value depends on demand, or felt utility," or again, that it is "determined by demand." All that Aristotle

says is that without demand there would be no exchange. But the theory of value which he suggests is hardly expressed by the statement that "objects are measured against one another in terms of the amount of demand which they excite." The truth is that Aristotle is not concerned with the theory of value in the modern sense. The question he is considering is not "How is the value of products actually determined?" but "How ought it to be determined?" It is a question of justice. The answer he gives is not very clear, but it is at any rate more ethical than economic—and more akin to the socialistic than to the "commercial" theory of value. It hardly seems, again, as if Mr. Barker has done sufficient justice to the social and political ideas underlying (and to a certain extent justifying) Aristotle's distrust of the "trade-spirit." In remarking that Plato was more inclined to recognize the services of the middleman, Mr. Barker might have added an explicit passage from the "Laws." The chapter on Aristotle's conceptions of Law and Justice is admirable throughout, and is summed up in the paradox that "a liberty which is subjection, an equality which consists in inequality, are the guiding conceptions of Aristotle."

Space prevents me from raising further points. Attention, however, should be drawn to the Epilogue, in which Mr. Barker sketches the later history of the "Politics," as also to a chronological table of events bearing on the text. The appendices are devoted to a sketch of the later history of the "Republic" and to a curious account of a newspaper published in 1664 and entitled *Observations, Historical, Political and Philosophical, upon Aristotle's First Book of Political Government, together with a Narrative of State Affairs in England, Scotland and Ireland, etc.*

Not the least valuable part of Mr. Barker's book consists in a copious and relevant selection of modern parallels and applications. In particular, Mr. Barker has, as he tells us, taken Aristotle's conceptions of citizenship, of democracy, and of distributive justice, and used them to illustrate and illuminate the conditions of modern citizenship, the problems of modern democracy, and the distribution of political power in the modern State. Perhaps Mr. Barker might have gone further and compared, for instance, Aristotle's idea of law and of sovereignty with modern theories, if only to show how little they have in common; and the question of the ground of political obligation might have been explicitly treated. Mr. Barker, in fact, has

given the student so much that he may well be tempted to ask for more. As it is, Mr. Barker's book is much more than a contribution to an understanding of Greek political thought; it is an admirable text-book on political science, as well as an admirable popularization (in the best sense) of the best theory, both ancient and modern.

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INDIVIDUELLE UND SOZIALE ETHIK. Vierzehn Vorträge. Von Dr. A. Dorner. Berlin: C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn, 1906.

This collection of fourteen lectures delivered in Königsberg, and printed by wish of those who heard them delivered, has for its object the analysis of current popular theories on ethical subjects, in the hope of reconciling (Frieden zu stiften) what the author regards as the extreme wings of the discussion, viz.: State socialism on the one hand, and the individualism which culminates in Nietzsche on the other. This reconciliation is effected by pointing out that the ethical culture of the individual is impossible apart from a community of persons, while, on the other hand, the life of the community is made up of the activities of individuals. "The intercourse of individuals, whether as free persons or as free organizations of persons, is the central ground of ethics." Individual differences in character, gift, and office, serve the public good and increase the richness of the public life, when these differences in the individual are held together and unified by a culture which is universal in character. The community which is thus enriched by the intercourse, the mutual service, and mutual "give and take" of cultured individuals, is not the State, but "die durch den Staat geordnete Gesamtheit aller ethischen Gemindschaften" (page 237).

In considering the widespread popular desire to free ethical theory from the authority of religion as well as from the tradition of the great philosophers and from metaphysical implications, Dr. Dorner maintains that while conduct is the result of natural gift and capacity in the individuals, the characteristic fact in human conduct is always that it is the activity of a self-conscious individual, and that this fact differentiates ethical law from the law of material nature, and is the ground of his ultimate position that "Auf sich allein kann nur eine Gesinnungsethik